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A Douglas–Rachford Splitting for Semi-decentralized Equilibrium Seeking
in Generalized Aggregative Games
Giuseppe Belgioioso Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We address the generalized aggregative equilib-
rium seeking problem for noncooperative agents playing aver-
age aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. First, we
use operator theory to characterize the generalized aggregative
equilibria of the game as the zeros of a monotone set-valued
operator. Then, we massage the Douglas–Rachford splitting
to solve the monotone inclusion problem and derive a single
layer, semi-decentralized algorithm whose global convergence
is guaranteed under mild assumptions. The potential of the
proposed Douglas–Rachford algorithm is shown on a simplified
resource allocation game, where we observe faster convergence
with respect to forward-backward algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aggregative games in societal challenges
An aggregative game is a collection of inter-dependent
optimization problems associated with noncooperative de-
cision makers, or agents, where each agent is affected by
some aggregate effect of all the agents [1], [2]. Remarkably,
aggregative games arise in several societal challenges, such
as demand side management in the smart grid [3], e.g.
for charging/discharging of electric vehicles [4], [5], [6],
[7], demand-response regulation in competitive markets [8],
congestion control in traffic and communication networks
[9]. The common denominator is in fact the presence of
a large number of selfish agents, whose aggregate actions
may disrupt the shared infrastructure, e.g. the power or the
transportation network, if left uncontrolled.
Computational game theory and monotone operator theory
Designing solution methods for multi-agent equilibrium
problems in aggregative games has recently gained high
research interest. A fast-growing literature has been in fact
developing semi-decentralized and distributed algorithms for
aggregative games without coupling constraints [10], [11],
and semi-decentralized algorithms for aggregative games
with coupling constraints [12], [13]. With focus on the gener-
alized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problem, the formulations in
[13], [14] have shown an elegant approach based on mono-
tone operator theory [15] to characterize the equilibrium
solutions as the zeros of a monotone operator. Not only is the
monotone-operator-theoretic approach general – e.g., unlike
variational inequalities, smoothness of the cost functions is
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not required – but also computationally viable, since several
design strategies to solve monotone inclusions are already
well established, e.g. operator-splitting methods [15, §26].
Critical review of solution algorithms for aggregative games
Few algorithms are available in the literature for solving
certain sub-classes of monotone aggregative games with
coupling constraints, each with important technical or com-
putational limitations. Specifically, forward-backward (FB)
methods, that include projected-pseudo-gradient methods,
require the pseudo-subdifferential mapping to be cocoercive
[16], strictly [11], [17] or strongly monotone [18], [14]. To
be applicable to (aggregative) games with (non-cocoercive,
non-strictly) monotone pseudo-subdifferential mapping, the
FB method shall be augmented with a vanishing regu-
larization. This approach is known as iterative Tikhonov
regularization (ITR) and generates a FB algorithm with
double-layer vanishing step sizes [19], where the actual step
size shall vanish faster than the vanishing regularization
term [19, (A2.2), §2.1]. In practice, however, methods based
on (double-layer) vanishing step sizes typically have slow
speed of convergence, which is computationally undesirable.
To solve (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone aggrega-
tive games via non-vanishing iterative steps, the forward-
backward-forward (FBF) method adds an additional forward
step to the FB algorithm. Unfortunately, FB, ITR and FBF
methods require the cost functions of the agents to have the
non-differentiable part separable and dependent on the local
decision variable only [13, §II.A]. Recently, the precondi-
tioned proximal-point (PPP) method was proposed to solve
monotone (aggregative) games, virtually with no additional
technical assumption other than monotonicity of the pseudo-
subdifferential mapping [20]. Unfortunately, however, the
PPP method generates a double-layer algorithm, in which
each (outer) iteration involves the solution of a sub-game
without coupling constraints, via nested (inner) iterations.
Together with vanishing step sizes, we can regard double-
layer or nested iterations as a computational limitation.
Why the Douglas–Rachford splitting?
Essentially, none of the currently available algorithms
is suitable for efficiently computing a GNE in (general)
monotone aggregative games. The Douglas–Rachford (DR)
splitting [15, §26.3] has instead the potential to overcome the
technical limitations of the forward-backward and forward-
backward-forward methods and the computational drawbacks
of the iterative-regulation and proximal-point methods. Our
motivation for studying the DR splitting is partially inspired
by the celebrated Alternating Direction Method of Multipli-
ers (ADMM) in distributed optimization, which is a special
implementation of the DR splitting method [21].
Contribution of this paper
Unfortunately, the direct application of the DR splitting on
the classic monotone operator that defines the GNE problem
does not generate a suitable solution algorithm. The second
main technical difficulty is that the algorithms generated by
the standard DR splitting method are not semi-decentralized.
On the contrary, since we consider aggregative games, we
require the structure of the computation and information
exchange to be semi-decentralized, which includes the re-
quirement that coordination signals for the agents shall be
computed based on aggregate information only.
In this paper, we focus on the class of generalized ag-
gregative equilibria (GAE) and resolve the two complications
above. Our main technical contribution is to massage the im-
plementation of the DR splitting method with an equivalent
monotone inclusion defined on an extended space. In turn,
we derive a single-layer, fixed-step, semi-decentralized algo-
rithm for the computation of a GAE in aggregative games.
Thanks to the semi-decentralized structure, the computational
complexity of the derived algorithm is only mildly dependent
(virtually, independent) on the number of agents. Finally, we
show via numerical simulations that our algorithm inherits
the advantages of the DR splitting in terms of fast speed of
convergence.
Basic notation
R denotes the set of real numbers, and R := R∪{∞} the
set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector
with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may
add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript.
A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between matrices
A and B; ‖A‖ denotes the maximum singular value of A;
eig(A) denotes the set of eigenvalues of A. Given N vectors
x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
.
Operator theoretic definitions
Id(·) denotes the identity operator. The mapping ιS :
R
n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set
S ⊆ Rn, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a
closed set S ⊆ Rn, the mapping projS : R
n → S denotes
the projection onto S, i.e., projS(x) = argminy∈S ‖y − x‖.
The set-valued mapping NS : R
n ⇒ Rn denotes the normal
cone operator for the the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. For a
function ψ : Rn → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈ Rn | ψ(x) < ∞};
∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ Rn denotes its subdifferential set-valued
mapping, defined as ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈ Rn | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) +
v⊤(z − x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)}; A set-valued mapping
F : Rn ⇒ Rn is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous, with ℓ > 0, if
‖u− v‖ ≤ ℓ‖x− y‖ for all x, y ∈ Rn, u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y);
F is (strictly) monotone if (u − v)⊤(x − y) ≥ (>) 0 for
all x 6= y ∈ Rn, u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y); F is η-strongly
monotone, with η > 0, if (u − v)⊤(x − y) ≥ η ‖x− y‖2
for all x 6= y ∈ Rn, u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y); F is η-
averaged, with η ∈ (0, 1), if ‖F(x)−F(y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2−
1−η
η ‖(Id−F) (x) − (Id−F) (y)‖
2
, for all x, y ∈ Rn; F
is β-cocoercive, with β > 0, if βF is 12 -averaged. With
JF := (Id + F)
−1, we denote the resolvent operator of F ,
which is 12 -averaged if and only if F is monotone; fix (F) :=
{x ∈ Rn | x ∈ F(x)} and zer (F) := {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ A(x)}
denote the set of fixed points and of zeros, respectively.
II. GENERALIZED AGGREGATIVE GAMES
A. Mathematical formulation
We consider a set of N noncooperative agents, where each
agent i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N} shall choose its decision variable
(i.e., strategy) xi from the local decision set Ωi ⊆ Rn with
the aim of minimizing its local cost function (xi,x−i) 7→
Ji (xi,x−i) : R
n × Rn(N−1) → R, which depends on both
the local variable xi (first argument) and on the decision
variables of the other agents, x−i = col ({xj}j 6=i) (second
argument).
We focus on the class of average aggregative games, where
the cost function of each agent depends on the local decision
variable and on the value of the average strategy, i.e.,
xˆ := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi = Mnx,
where Mn :=
1
N 1
⊤
N ⊗ In and x = col(x1, · · · , xN ). Thus,
for each i ∈ N , there exists a function fi : Rn × Rn → R
such that cost function J i can be written as
Ji(xi,x−i) =: fi (xi,Mnx)
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the
coupling among the agents arises not only via the cost
functions, but also via their feasible decision sets. In our
setup, the coupling constraints are described by an affine
function, x 7→ Ax − b, where A ∈ Rm×nN and b ∈ Rm.
Thus, the collective feasible set, X ⊆ RnN , reads as
X :=
N∏
i=1
Ωi
⋂{
x ∈ RNn|Ax− b ≤ 0m
}
; (1)
while the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ N is
characterized by the set-valued mapping Xi, defined as
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi |Aiyi − bi ≤
∑N
j 6=i bj −Ajxj
}
,
where
∑N
i=1 bi = b, Ai ∈ R
m×n and A = [A1, . . . , AN ].
The set Ωi represents the local decision set for agent i, while
the matrix Ai and bi are local data which characterize how
agent i is involved in the coupling constraints.
Remark 1 (Affine coupling constraint): Affine coupling
constraints as considered in this paper are very common in
the literature of noncooperative games, see [18], [12], [14],
[17]. Moreover, we recall that the more general case with
separable convex coupling constraints can be reformulated
as game via affine coupling constraints [22, Remark 2]. 
Next, we postulate standard convexity and compactness
assumptions for the constraint sets, and convexity of the cost
functions with respect to their local decision variable.
Standing Assumption 1 (Compact convex constraints):
For each i ∈ N , the set Ωi is nonempty, compact and convex.
The set X satisfies the Slater’s constraint qualification. 
Standing Assumption 2 (Convex functions): For all i ∈
N , and for all fixed z ∈
∏
j 6=i Ωj and w ∈
1
N
∑
j 6=i Ωj
the functions Ji ( · , z) and fi ( · , w) are convex. 
In summary, the aim of each agent i, given the decision
variables of the other agents, is to choose a strategy xi that
solves its local optimization problem, according to the game
setup previously described, i.e.,
min
xi∈Rn
Ji
(
xi,x−i
)
s.t. xi ∈ Xi(x−i). (2)
B. Nash vs aggregative equilibria
From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the prob-
lem to compute a Nash equilibrium, as formalized next.
Definition 1 (Generalized ε-Nash equilibrium): A collec-
tive strategy x∗ is a generalized ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-GNE)
of the aggregative game in (2) if x∗ ∈ X and, for all i ∈ N
and for all z ∈ Xi(x∗−i)
fi (x
∗
i ,Mnx
∗) ≤ fi
(
z, 1N z +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i x
∗
j
)
+ ε. (3)
If (3) holds with ε = 0 then x∗ is a GNE. 
In other words, a set of strategies is a genralized Nash
equilibrium if no agent can improve its objective function
by unilaterally changing its strategy to another feasible one.
The concept of aggregative equilibrium springs from the
intuition that the contribution of each agent to the aggrega-
tion decreases as the population size grows. Technically, at
the limit for N →∞, the decision variable of agent i does
not influence the second argument of its cost function fi.
Definition 2 (Generalized aggregative equilibrium): A
collective strategy x¯ is a generalized aggregative equilibrium
(GAE) of the aggregative game in (2) if x¯ ∈ X and, for all
i ∈ N and for all z ∈ Xi(x¯−i)
fi (x¯i,Mnx¯) ≤ fi (z, Mnx¯) . 
Nash and aggregative equilibria are strictly connected. In-
deed, under some mild assumptions it can be proven that
every GAE equilibrium is an ε-GNE equilibrium, with ǫ
tending to zero as N grows [23, §4].
Under Assumptions 1−2, the existence of a GNE and a
GAE of the game in (2) follows from Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem [24, Prop. 12.7], while uniqueness does not hold in
general.
C. Variational equilibria and pseudo-subdifferentials
Within all the possible equilibria, we focus on an important
subclass, with some relevant structural properties, such as
“larger social stability” and “economic fairness” [25, Th.
4.8], that corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate
generalized variational inequality1(GVI).
1Definition (Generalized variational inequality): Consider a closed con-
vex set W ⊆ Rn, a set-valued mapping Ψ :W ⇒ Rn and a single-valued
mapping ψ : W → Rn. The generalized variational inequality problem
GVI(W,Ψ), is the problem to find x∗ ∈ W and g∗ ∈ Ψ(x∗) such that
(x−x∗)⊤ g∗ ≥ 0 for all x ∈W . If Ψ(x) = {ψ(x)} for all x ∈ W , then
GVI(W ,Ψ) reduces to the variational inequality problem VI(W,ψ). 
A fundamental mapping in noncooperative games is the
so-called pseudo-subdifferential, F : X ⇒ RnN , defined as
F (x) := col
(
{∂xi fi (xi, Mnx)}i∈N
)
. (4)
Namely, the mapping F is obtained by stacking together
the subdifferentials of the agents’ objective functions with
respect to their local decision variables.
Under Assumptions 1−2, it follows by [24, Prop. 12.4]
that any solution to GVI(X , F ) is a (variational) generalized
Nash equilibrium (v-GNE) of the game in (2). The inverse
implication is not true in general, and actually in passing
from the Nash equilibrium problem to the GVI, most solu-
tions are lost [24, §12.2.2] – indeed, a game may have a Nash
equilibrium while the corresponding GVI has no solution.
Note that, if the cost functions Ji’s are differentiable, then
GVI(X , F ) reduces to VI(X , F ), which can be solved via
projected-pseudogradient algorithms [11], [18], [26], [27].
Similarly, given the mapping Fa : X ⇒ R
nN , defined as
Fa(x) := col
(
{∂xi fi (xi, z) |z=Mnx}i∈N
)
, (5)
one can prove that every solution to GVI(X , Fa) is a
(variational) generalized aggregative equilibrium (v-GAE) of
the game in (2). The remainder of the paper is devoted to
design a semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a v-GAE.
III. GENERALIZED AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM AS ZERO
OF THE SUM OF TWO MONOTONE OPERATORS
In this section, we exploit operator theory to recast the
GAE seeking problem into a monotone inclusion, namely, the
problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator.
To make the resulting monotone inclusion suitable for the
application of the DR splitting, we extend the original game
in (2), by including an additional player. Specifically, let us
introduce the extended game characterized by the following
N + 1 coupled optimization problems:
(∀i ∈ N )


argmin
xi, yi
fi (xi, σ) + ιCi(xi, yi)
s.t. Mmy ≤ 0m
σ −Mnx = 0n
(6)


argmin
σ∈Rn
fc(x, σ)
s.t. σ −Mnx = 0n
(7)
where Ci := {(xi, yi) ∈ Ωi × Rm | yi = Aixi − bi} is a
local constraint set and fc(x, σ) := 0.
The next statement shows that the v-GNE of the extended
game in (6)-(7) fully characterize the v-GAE of the original
game in (2).
Proposition 1: The collective strategy x¯ is a v-GAE of
the game in (2) if and only if col(x¯, y¯, σ¯) is a v-GNE of the
game in (6)–(7), with σ¯ = Mnx¯ and y¯i = Aix¯i − bi for all
i ∈ N . 
Remark 2: According to a semi-decentralized communi-
cation structure, the additional player in (7) represents the
central coordinator, which does not participate in the game,
i.e., fc(x, σ) ≡ 0, and whose “decision variable” σ must be
equal to the average strategy, i.e., σ = Mnx. 
Remark 3: The additional local variables yi’s and con-
straint sets Ci’s transform the original affine coupling con-
straints, i.e., Ax− b ≤ 0, into: (1) N local constraints, i.e.,
(xi, yi) ∈ Ci, and (2) one coupling constraint in aggregative
form, Mmy ≤ 0, which is more convenient to handle in a
semi-decentralized communication structure. 
Next, we show that the v-GAE of the original game in (2)
are zeros of a set-valued operator obtained by grouping the
KKT conditions of the extended game in (6)–(7).
With this aim, let us introduce the mapping T : Rd ⇒ Rd,
with d = nN +mN + 2n+m, defined as
T :


x
y
σ
µ
λ

 7→


Fe(x, σ) + ∂xιC(x,y)−M⊤n µ
∂yιC(x,y) +M
⊤
mλ
∂σfc(x, σ) + µ
−(σ −Mnx)
NRm
≥0
(λ)−Mmy

 , (8)
where C := {(x,y) ∈ R(n+m)N | (xi, yi) ∈ Ci, ∀i ∈ N},
∂σfc = 0 and Fe : R
nN+n ⇒ RNn is defined as
Fe(x, σ) = col
(
{∂xifi (xi, σ)}
N
i=1
)
.
Proposition 2: The following statements are equivalent:
(i) x∗ is a v-GNE of the extended game in (6)–(7);
(ii) ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that col(x
∗,y∗, σ∗, µ∗, λ∗) ∈ zerT ,
with σ∗ = Mx∗, µ∗ = 0 and y∗i = Aix
∗
i , ∀i ∈ N . 
Now, we show that the set-valued operator T can be
written as the sum of two mappings that are maximally
monotone if the extended pseudo-subdifferential Fe × ∂σfc
is such. Thus, let us introduce the mappings
A := (Fe × 0d1) + (NC × 0d2), (9)
B := (0d3 ×NRm≥0) + S, (10)
where d1 = d− nN , d2 = d1 −mN , d3 = d−m and
S :


x
y
σ
µ
λ

 7→


0 0 0 −M⊤n 0
0 0 0 0 M⊤m
0 0 0 I 0
Mn 0 −I 0 0
0 −Mm 0 0 0




x
y
σ
µ
λ

 .
Standing Assumption 3 (Extended monotonicity): The
mapping Fe × ∂σfc is maximally monotone. 
Lemma 1: The mapping T in (8) can be split as T =
A+B, with A and B as in (9)-(10). If Assumption 3 holds,
then the mappings A and B are maximally monotone. 
Remark 4: Strong (strict) monotonicity of the pseudo-
subdifferential F in (4) is a usual assumption in the literature
of noncooperative game theory, see [14], [18], [11], [13].
Here, we postulate (non-strict) monotonicity of the extended
pseudo-subdifferential Fe × ∂σfc. Indeed, Assumption 3,
represents an extended monotonicity assumption for the
augmented spaces, see [28, A. 3] for a similar assumption.

Remark 5: Since Fe(x, σ)|σ=Mx = Fa(x), Assumption 3
implies the monotonicity of the mapping Fa in (5). By [24,
Prop. 12.11], this is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a v-GAE of the game in (2). 
IV. SEMI-DECENTRALIZED AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING VIA DOUGLAS-RACHFORD SPLITTING
In this section, we derive a single layer, fixed step, semi-
decentralized algorithm to compute a v-GAE in aggregative
games as in (2). The algorithm is obtained by solving the
monotone inclusion in Prop. 2(ii) via DR splitting.
A. Douglas–Rachford operator splitting
In Section III we show that the original GAE equilibrium
problem is fully characterized by the monotone inclusion
ω∗ ∈ zer(A+ B), (11)
where A and B are maximally monotone mappings.
To solve (11), several operator splittings can be considered
[15, §26]. Here, we adopt the DR splitting [15, Th. 26.11],
whose iterations for the mappingsA and B are recalled next.
Let (λn)n∈N be a sequence in [0, 2] such that∑
n∈N λn(2− λn) = +∞. Set ω
0 ∈ Rd, then
(∀k ∈ N)

ωk+1/2 = JA(ω˜
k),
ω˜k+1/2 = 2ωk+1/2 − ω˜k,
ωk+1 = JB(ω˜
k+1/2),
ω˜k+1 = ω˜k + λk(ω
k+1 − ωk+1/2).
(12)
The DR method demands for the solution of some implicit
equations to evaluate the resolvent operators JA and JB (see
Lemma 2 in the Appendix). On the contrary, non-implicit
forward-backward methods perform explicit evaluation of
either A or B, at the cost of conditional stability in the form
of step size constraints. However, the advantage of uncon-
strained step sizes comes with the price that the implicit
equations can be solved only approximately in practice.
In the next subsection, we discuss the semi-decentralized
algorithm obtained by explicitly writing the iterations in (12).
The formal derivation of the algorithm is in the Appendix.
B. Semi-decentralized algorithm
Our DR algorithm works as follows: The central coordi-
nator is responsible for the updates of the multipliers λ, µ
and the strategy σ, and communicates with the agents via
broadcasting. The agents update their local variables xi’s,
yi’s and communicate with the central coordinator only in
aggregative form.
The next table summarizes the proposed DR algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1: Semi-decentralized Douglas–Rachford
Initialization:
1. Local: For all i ∈ N , set γi > 0, x0i ∈ Ωi, y
0
i = Aix
0
i−bi.
2. Central: Set σ0 = Mnx
0, µ0 = 0n, λ
0 ∈ Rm≥0, α > 0,
δc ∈ (0,
1
γˆ ), βc ∈ (0,
1
α+γˆ/N ), where γˆ :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 γi.
Iterate until convergence:
1. a) Local strategy update: for each agent i ∈ N
xk+1i = argmin
z∈Ωi
fi
(
z, σk
)
+ (A⊤i λ
k − 1N µ
k)
⊤
z
+ 12γi
∥∥z − xki ∥∥2(I+A⊤
i
Ai)
,
yk+1i = Aix
k+1
i − bi.
b) Communication: (xˆk+1, yˆk+1)→ coordinator.
2. a) Central multipliers and strategy updates:
λk+1 = proj
Rm
≥0
(
λk + δc
(
2yˆk+1 − yˆk
))
,
µk+1 = µk − βc (2xˆk+1 − xˆk − σk + αµk),
σk+1 = σk − αµk+1.
b) Broadcast: (λk+1, µk+1, σk+1)→ agents.
Communications: At each iteration k+1, a communication
round between the agents and the central coordinator takes
place. Specifically, after a local update, the agents forward
their updated strategies, xk+1i ’s, y
k+1
i ’s, to the central coor-
dinator, which receives this information in aggregative form,
i.e., xˆk+1 = 1N
∑N
j=1 x
k+1
j , yˆ
k+1 = 1N
∑N
j=1 y
k+1
j . In turn,
the coordinator broadcasts the updated multipliers, λk+1,
µk+1 and its strategy σk+1, to the agents.
Strategies update: At iteration k + 1, for all i ∈ N , the
agent i updates its local strategies as follows:
xk+1i = argmin
z∈Ωi
fi
(
z, σk
)
+ 〈A⊤i λ
k − 1N µ
k, z〉
+ 12γi
∥∥z − xki ∥∥2(I+A⊤
i
Ai)
, (13)
yk+1i = Aix
k+1
i − bi.
The term (A⊤i λ
k − 1N µ
k)
⊤
z is a penalization to satisfy the
coupling constraints Ax−b ≤ 0m and σ−Mx = 0n, while
1
2γi
∥∥z − xki ∥∥2(I+A⊤
i
Ai)
is a weighted proximal term.
After the communication step that follows the local actions
update (13), the central coordinator updates the multipliers
and its strategy as follows:
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λk + δc
(
2yˆk+1 − yˆk
))
, (14)
µk+1 = µk − βc (2xˆk+1 − xˆk − σk + αµk), (15)
σk+1 = σk − αµk+1. (16)
Remarkably, (14) coincides with the dual update of projected
pseudo-gradient methods for generalized games [14], [16],
[23]. On the other hand, the updates (15)-(16) make sure
that the variable σ tracks the average state of the population,
xˆ, and asymptotically converges to it. We remark that all the
central updates (14)–(16) require information in aggregative
form, i.e., xˆk+1, yˆk+1, only.
In the next statement, we establish the global convergence
of Algorithm 1 to a v-GAE of the game in (2).
Theorem 1: The sequence
(
col(xk,yk, σk, µk, λk)
)∞
k=0
generated by Algorithm 1 globally converges to some
col(x∗,y∗, σ∗, µ∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), with T as in (8), where
x∗ is a v-GAE of the game in (2). 
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME
A. Illustrative problem setup
For illustration purposes, we consider a simplified resource
allocation game. Specifically, we suppose that each agent has
to complete a given task in n time slots. Let us denote by
xi(h) ∈ [0, 1] the ratio of the task that agent i allocates
at time slot h, and by u¯i ∈ [0, 1]n a personalized vector
of upper constraints on the maximum allowed allocation for
each time slot. The set of possible allocation vectors for agent
i is therefore given by
Ωi := {xi ∈ Rn| 0 ≤ xi ≤ u¯i, 1⊤n xi = 1}, (17)
with component-wise inequalities. Moreover, we suppose
that there exists an upper constraint b¯(h) > 0, for the sum
among the local allocations, at each time slot h, i.e.,∑N
i=1 wixi(h) ≤ b¯(h), for h = 1, · · · , n
where wi ≥ 0 weights the contribution of agent i in the
summation. The admissible overall strategy profile x, must
therefore lie within the set
X := {x ∈
∏N
i=1 Ωi |Ax ≤ b}, (18)
where b := col
(
{b¯(1), · · · , b¯(n)
)
and A := w⊤ ⊗ In, with
w := col(w1, · · · , wN ).
The aim of each agent i is to choose a strategy xi within
(17) and such that (xi,x−i) satisfies (18), while minimizing
its local cost function Ji, defined as
Ji(xi,x−i) :=
1
2
ai ‖xi − x˜i‖
2 + (QiMx)
⊤xi, (19)
where ai ∈ R>0 and Qi  0. The cost function in (19)
represents the cost for deviating from a pre-fixed allocation
schedule x˜i plus an additional price that is proportional
to the average allocation, Mx. Essentially, each agent has
an incentive to allocate its task in time slots that are not
congested by the other agents.
B. Numerical study
We consider N = 103 agents with n = 10 time slots and
we randomly set their parameters as ai ∼ [1, 2], wi ∼ [1, 2],
Qi = qiIn + Q¯i, with qi ∼ [1, 2], (Q¯i)j,k ∼ [0, 0.1], for
all j, k ∈ N , all with uniform distribution. We randomly
generate the local and the coupling bounds as: 1⊤u¯i = 2 and
bi =
b
N , for all i ∈ N , with
1
2Au¯ ≤ b ≤
2
3Au¯ to guarantee
the feasibility and avoid redundancy in the constraints. The
desired allocation vectors are set, for all i ∈ N , as x˜i :=
projXi(e1), where e1 := [1, 0, · · · , 0]
⊤ ∈ Rn, namely, each
agent wants to complete its task in the first time slot.
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Fig. 1: Mean value of the sequence ‖x(k)− x¯‖ / ‖x(0)− x¯‖ in 50
simulations, for the DR algorithm (red line) and the preconditioned
forward-backward (blue line) in [16]. The parameters of the DR
are set as follows: α = 1, δc = βc = 0.5 and γi = 1, ∀i ∈ N .
In Fig. 1, we confront the convergence properties on the
described scenario of the proposed DR algorithm versus the
preconditioned Forward-Backward (pFB) algorithm in [16,
Alg. 1], modified to find a v-GAE. Specifically, to evaluate
the convergence speed of the algorithms, we consider the se-
quence
∥∥xk − x¯∥∥, i.e., the distance of the estimated solution
at iteration k, xk, from the v-GAE of the game, x¯.
Fig. 1 shows the mean value of the sequence
∥∥xk − x¯∥∥
in 50 simulations, for the DR and the pFB algorithms. We
note that, on this scenario, the DR algorithm converges,
in average, more than 10 times faster with respect to the
projection-type algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
A particular massaged implementation of the Douglas–
Rachford operator splitting is applicable to generalized ag-
gregative games for the computation of an aggregate equi-
librium via a single-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm. In
our numerical experience, the derived Douglas–Rachford
algorithm outperforms forward-backward, i.e., projected-
pseudogradient, algorithms in terms of convergence speed.
The convergence guarantees for our DR algorithm are
limited by Assumption 3, i.e., monotonicity on the extended
space, which does not hold in general. However, our numeri-
cal experience suggests that global convergence holds even if
the assumption does not hold. Thus, it would be interesting to
weaken Assumption 3 with a monotonicity-type assumption
on the original game. It would be also valuable to adapt our
DR algorithm to generalized Nash equilibrium seeking.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us introduce the pseudo-
subdifferential mapping of the extended game in (6)–(7)
U :


x
y
σ

 7→


col
(
{∂xi [fi (xi, σ) + ιCi(xi, yi)]}
N
i=1
)
col
(
{∂yi [fi (xi, σ) + ιCi(xi, yi)]}
N
i=1
)
∂σfc(x, σ)


and the set of coupling constraints V , defined as
V := {col(x,y, σ) | NMy ≤ 0, σ −Mx = 0} .
We recall that col(x∗,y∗, σ∗) is a v-GNE of the extended
game in (6)–(7) if and only if it is a solution to GVI(V,U).
It follows from [29, Th. 3.1], that col(x∗,y∗, σ∗) solves
GVI(V,U) if and only if there exist λ∗ and µ∗ such that
the following (N + 1) sets of KKT conditions are satisfied:
∀i


0 ∈ ∂xi(fi (x
∗
i , σ
∗) + ιCi(x
∗
i , y
∗
i ))−
1
N µ
∗
0 ∈ ∂yiιCi(x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) + λ
∗
0 = σ∗ −Mnx∗
0 ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ∗)−NMmy
∗
(20)
{
0 = ∂σfc(x
∗, σ∗) + µ∗
0 = σ∗ −Mnx∗
(21)
Note that (20)–(21) are satisfied if and only if σ∗ = Mnx
∗,
µ∗ = 0 (since ∂σfc(x
∗, σ∗) = 0) and for all i ∈ N

0 ∈ ∂xifi (x
∗
i , σ
∗) |σ∗=Mx∗ + ιCi(x
∗
i , y
∗
i )
0 ∈ ∂yi ιCi(x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) + λ
∗
0 ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ∗)−NMy∗
(22)
If we define zi = col(xi, yi), then the first two inclusions in
(22) can be recast in compact form as
0 ∈ ∂zi
[
fi(x
∗
i , σ
∗)|σ∗=Mx∗ + ιCi(x
∗
i , y
∗
i ) + λ
⊤y∗i
]
.
Note that the last inclusion is satisfied if and only if
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈ Ci, i.e., y
∗
i = Aix
∗
i − bi and x
∗
i ∈ Ωi, and
0 ∈ ∂xi
[
fi(x
∗
i , σ
∗)|σ∗=Mx∗ + ιΩi(x
∗
i ) + λ
∗⊤Aix
∗
i
]
. Hence,
col(x∗,y∗, λ∗) satisfies the KKT conditions in (22) if and
only if, for all i ∈ N , y∗i = Aix
∗
i − bi and{
0 ∈ ∂xifi (x
∗
i , σ
∗) |σ∗=Mx∗ +NΩi(x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ
∗
0 ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ∗)− (Ax∗ − b)
(23)
By [29, Th. 3.1], the pair (x∗i , λ
∗) satisfy (23) for all i ∈ N
if and only if x∗ solves GVI(Fa,X ), with Fa as in (5) and
X as in (1), namely, x∗ is a v-GAE of the game in (2). 
Proof of Proposition 2: The statement follows by noticing
that (x∗i , y
∗
i , σ
∗, µ∗, λ∗) satisfy the KKT in (20)–(21), for all
i ∈ N , if and only if col(x∗,y∗, σ∗, µ∗, λ∗) ∈ zerT . 
Proof of Lemma 1: The mapping A is the sum of 2 terms:
(1) A1 = NC × 0d2 , which is maximally monotone since is
the direct sum of maximally monotone operators [15, Prop.
20.23], namely, NC , normal cone of a closed convex set,
thus maximally monotone, and 0d2 , obviously maximally
monotone; (2) A2 = Fe×0d1 which is maximally monotone
by Assumption 3. The maximal monotonicity of A1+A2 =
A follows from [15, Cor. 24.4(i)], since domFe×0d1 = R
d.
The mapping B is the sum of 2 terms: (1) B1 = 0d3 ×R
m
≥0
which is maximally monotone for the same reasons of A1
and (2) S which is a linear, skew symmetric operator, thus
maximally monotone [15, Ex. 20.30]. Then, the maximal
monotonicity of B1+B2 = B follows from [15, Cor. 24.4(i)]
since domB2 = Rd. 
Proof of Theorem 1:
The proof is divided in two parts:
(1) We show that Algorithm 1 corresponds to the Douglas-
Rachford splitting applied on the mappings ΓA and
ΓB, where Γ is a diagonal positive definite matrix that
characterizes the step sizes of the algorithm.
(2) We show that the mappings ΓA and ΓB satisfy the
assumptions of [15, Th. 26.11], which establishes global
convergence to zer(ΓA+ΓB) = zer(A+ B) = zer(T ).
(1): The goal is to explicitly derive the iterations in (12) for
the mappings ΓA and ΓB, where Γ ≻ 0 is defined as
Γ := blkdiag(γ ⊗ In,γ ⊗ Im, αIn, βIn, δIm), (24)
with γ = diag(γ1, · · · , γN ) and α, β, δ, γi ∈ R>0, ∀i ∈ N .
The next Lemma shows how to compute the implicit
resolvents JΓA and JΓB in a semi-decentralized fashion.
Lemma 2: For any positive definite matrix Γ as in (24),
JΓA = (Id + ΓA)
−1
and JΓB = (Id + ΓB)
−1
read as
(i) JΓA (col(x,y, σ, µ, λ)) 7→ col(x+,y+, σ, µ, λ), with
(∀i ∈ N )


x+i = argmin
v∈Ωi
fi (z, σ) +
1
2γi
‖v − xi‖
2
+ 12γi ‖Aiv − bi − yi‖
2
y+i = Aix
+
i − bi,
(25)
(ii) JΓB (col(x,y, σ, µ, λ)) 7→ col(x+,y+, σ+, µ+, λ+),
define P = 1⊤N ⊗ Im and γˆ :=
1
N
∑N
j=1 γj , then

µ+ = N(1+βα)N+βγˆ (µ+ β(σ −Mx))
λ+ = projRm
≥0
1
1+δNγˆ (λ+ δPy)
x+ = x+ γM⊤µ+
y+ = y − γP⊤λ+
σ+ = σ − αµ+,
(26)

Proof: (i) Let ω = col(x,y, σ, µ, λ), then
JΓA(ω) = (Id + ΓA)
−1(ω) = ω+
⇔ ω ∈ (Id + ΓA)(ω+)
⇔ 0 ∈ ω+ + ΓA(ω+)− ω (27)
By expanding (27) we obtain a system of equations and
inclusions, i.e., σ+ = σ, µ+ = µ, λ+ = λ and for all i ∈ N{
0 ∈ x+i − γi∂xi(fi
(
x+i , σ
)
+ ιCi(x
+
i , y
+
i ))− xi
0 ∈ y+i + γi∂yiιCi(x
+
i , y
+
i )− yi.
(28)
If we define z+i = col(x
+
i , y
+
i ), then (28) can be written as
0 ∈ ∂z+
i
[
γifi
(
x+i , σ
)
+ γiιCi(x
+
i , y
+
i ) +
1
2
∥∥z+i − zi∥∥2] .
The latter inclusion is verified if and only if
(x+i , y
+
i ) = argmin
v∈Ωi
w=Aiv−bi,
γifi (v, σ) +
1
2
∥∥∥∥
[
v − xi
w − yi
]∥∥∥∥
2
which is equivalent to (25) and concludes the proof.
(ii) Consider the analogous of inclusion (27) for B, i.e.,

x+ − γM⊤µ+ − x = 0
y+ + γP⊤λ+ − y = 0
σ+ + αµ+ − σ = 0
µ+ + β(Mx+ − σ+)− µ = 0
λ+ + δ(NRm
≥0
(λ+)− Py+)− λ ∋ 0
(29)
By substituting (29)b into (29)e and exploiting the equiva-
lence PγP⊤ = γˆPP⊤, we recast the latter inclusion as
∂λ+
[
διRm
≥0
(λ+) + 12δγˆ
∥∥∥P⊤λ+ − 1γˆ y∥∥∥2
+ 12
∥∥λ+ − λ∥∥2] ∋ 0. (30)
From (30), it follows that
λ+ = argmin
u∈Rm
≥0
1
2
δγˆ
∥∥P⊤u− γˆ−1y∥∥2 + 1
2
‖u− λ‖2 ,
which is a quadratic problem, i.e.,
λ+ = argmin
u∈Rm
≥0
1
2u
⊤Qu− c⊤u+ d, (31)
with Q = δγˆPP⊤ + I , c = δyP⊤ + λ, d = δ2γ¯−1y⊤y +
λ⊤λ. The explicit solution to (31) reads as
λ+ = projRm
≥0
Q−1c = projRm
≥0
1
1+δNγ¯ (λ+ δPy) .
The remaining equations in (29) can be solved by substitu-
tion, thus obtaining

µ+ = N(1+βα)N+βγ¯ (µ+ β(σ −Mx))
x+ = x+ γM⊤µ+
y+ = y − γP⊤λ+
σ+ = σ − αµ+
(32)
By exploiting (25) and (26), we explicitly write (12) for
the mappings ΓA and ΓB, with λk = 1 for all k ∈ N, i.e.,
(a)


x
k+1/2
i = argmin
z∈Ωi
fi
(
z, σ˜k
)
+ 12γi
∥∥z − x˜ki ∥∥2
+ 12γi
∥∥Aiz − bi − y˜ki ∥∥2 , ∀i ∈ N
y
k+1/2
i = Aix
k+1/2
i − bi, ∀i ∈ N
σk+1/2 = σ˜k
µk+1/2 = µ˜k
λk+1/2 = λ˜k
(b)


x˜
k+1/2
i = 2x
k+1/2
i − x˜
k
i , ∀i ∈ N
y˜
k+1/2
i = 2Aix
k+1/2
i − y˜
k
i , ∀i ∈ N
σ˜k+1/2 = σ˜k
µ˜k+1/2 = µ˜k
λ˜k+1/2 = λ˜k
(c)


xk+1i = x˜
k+1/2
i + γi
1
N µ
k+1, ∀i ∈ N
yk+1i = y˜
k+1/2
i − γiλ
k+1, ∀i ∈ N
σk+1 = σ˜k − αµk+1
µk+1 = N(1+βα)N+βγˆ (µ˜
k + β(σ˜k −M x˜k+1/2))
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
1
1+δNγˆ
(
λ˜k + δP y˜k+1/2
)
(d)


x˜k+1i = x
k+1/2
i + γi
1
N µ
k+1, ∀i ∈ N
y˜k+1i = y
k+1/2
i − γiλ
k+1, ∀i ∈ N
σ˜k+1 = σk+1
µ˜k+1 = µk+1
λ˜k+1 = λk+1
Finally, by sorting and simplifying (a)–(d), and setting
δc :=
δ
δγˆ+ 1
N
, δ ∈ R>0 ⇒ δc ∈ (0, γˆ
−1), (33)
βc :=
β
1+β(α+γˆ/N) , β ∈ R>0 ⇒ βc ∈ (0,
1
α+γˆ/N ), (34)
we obtain the iterations in Algorithm 1.
(2): The mappings A and B are maximally monotone,
by Lemma 1, and zer(A + B) 6= ∅, by Remark 5. Since
Γ = Γ⊤ ≻ 0, then ΓA and ΓB are maximally monotone
in the space defined by the norm ‖·‖Γ and zer(ΓA +
ΓB) = zer(A + B) 6= ∅. Therefore, we can apply [15, Th.
26.11] to establish the global convergence of the sequence(
col(xk,yk, σk, µk, λk)
)∞
k=0
generated by Algorithm 1, to
some col(x∗,y∗, σ∗, µ∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A + B) = zer(T ). By
Prop. 2, x∗ is a v-GNE of the extended game in (6)-(7). To
conclude, we recall Prop. 1 to show that x∗ is also a v-GAE
of the original game in (2). 
REFERENCES
[1] N. S. Kukushkin, “Best response dynamics in finite games with
additive aggregation,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 48, no. 1,
pp. 94–10, 2004.
[2] M. Jensen, “Aggregative games and best-reply potentials,” Economic
Theory, Springer, vol. 43, pp. 45–66, 2010.
[3] W. Saad, Z. Han, H. Poor, and T. Bas¸ar, “Game theoretic methods for
the smart grid,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, pp. 86–105, 2012.
[4] Z. Ma, D. Callaway, and I. Hiskens, “Decentralized charging control of
large populations of plug-in electric vehicles,” IEEE Trans. on Control
Systems Technology, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 67–78, 2013.
[5] F. Parise, M. Colombino, S. Grammatico, and J. Lygeros, “Mean field
constrained charging policy for large populations of plug-in electric
vehicles,” in Proc. of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,
Los Angeles, California, USA, 2014, pp. 5101–5106.
[6] Z. Ma, S. Zou, L. Ran, X. Shi, and I. Hiskens, “Efficient decentralized
coordination of large-scale plug-in electric vehicle charging,” Automat-
ica, vol. 69, pp. 35–47, 2016.
[7] S. Grammatico, “Exponentially convergent decentralized charging
control for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles,” in Proc.
of the IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Las Vegas, USA, 2016.
[8] N. Li, L. Chen, and M. A. Dahleh, “Demand response using linear
supply function bidding,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 6,
no. 4, pp. 1827–1838, 2015.
[9] J. Barrera and A. Garcia, “Dynamic incentives for congestion control,”
IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 299–310, 2015.
[10] S. Grammatico, F. Parise, M. Colombino, and J. Lygeros, “Decentral-
ized convergence to Nash equilibria in constrained deterministic mean
field control,” IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, vol. 61, no. 11, pp.
3315–3329, 2016.
[11] J. Koshal, A. Nedic´, and U. Shanbhag, “Distributed algorithms for
aggregative games on graphs,” Operations Research, vol. 64, no. 3,
pp. 680–704, 2016.
[12] S. Grammatico, “Dynamic control of agents playing aggregative games
with coupling constraints,” IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, vol. 62,
no. 9, pp. 4537 – 4548, 2017.
[13] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “Semi-decentralized Nash equilib-
rium seeking in aggregative games with coupling constraints and non-
differentiable cost functions,” IEEE Control Systems Letters, vol. 1,
no. 2, pp. 400–405, 2017.
[14] P. Yi and L. Pavel, “A distributed primal-dual algorithm for computa-
tion of generalized nash equilibria via operator splitting methods,” in
56th IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2017,
Melbourne, Australia, December 12-15, 2017, 2017, pp. 3841–3846.
[15] H. H. Bauschke, P. L. Combettes et al., Convex analysis and monotone
operator theory in Hilbert spaces. Springer, 2017, vol. 2011.
[16] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “Projected-gradient algorithms for
generalized equilibrium seeking in aggregative games are precondi-
tioned forward-backward methods,” in Proc. of the IEEE European
Control Conference, 2018.
[17] S. Liang, P. Yi, and Y. Hong, “Distributed nash equilibrium seeking
for aggregative games with coupled constraints,” Automatica, vol. 85,
pp. 179–185, 2017.
[18] D. Paccagnan, B. Gentile, F. Parise, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros,
“Distributed computation of generalized Nash equilibria in quadratic
aggregative games with affine coupling constraints,” in Proc. of the
IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Las Vegas, USA, 2016.
[19] A. Kannan and U. V. Shanbhag, “Distributed computation of equilibria
in monotone nash games via iterative regularization techniques,” SIAM
Journal on Optimization, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 1177–1205, 2012.
[20] P. Yi and L. Pavel, “Distributed generalized Nash
equilibria computation of monotone games via double-
layer preconditioned proximal-point algorithms,” IEEE
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, available online at:
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8309385/,
2018.
[21] P. Giselsson and S. Boyd, “Linear convergence and metric selection
for Douglas–Rachford splitting and admm,” IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 532–544, 2017.
[22] S. Grammatico, “Proximal dynamics in multi-agent network games,”
IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, available at
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8046094/,
2017.
[23] D. Paccagnan, B. Gentile, F. Parise, M. Kamgarpour, and J. Lygeros,
“Nash and Wardrop equilibria in aggregative games with coupling
constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, available at
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8395057,
2018.
[24] D. P. Palomar and Y. C. Eldar, Convex optimization in signal process-
ing and communications. Cambridge university press, 2010.
[25] F. Facchinei and C. Kanzow, “Generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems,” Annals of Operations Research, vol. 175, no. 1, pp. 177–211,
2010.
[26] G. Belgioioso and S. Grammatico, “On convexity and monotonicity in
generalized aggregative games,” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 50, no. 1,
pp. 14 338–14 343, 2017.
[27] F. Facchinei and J. Pang, Finite-dimensional variational inequalities
and complementarity problems. Springer Verlag, 2003.
[28] F. Salehisadaghiani and L. Pavel, “Distributed Nash equilibrium seek-
ing via the alternating direction method of multipliers,” IFAC World
Congress, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 6166–6171, 2017.
[29] A. Auslender and M. Teboulle, “Lagrangian duality and related
multiplier methods for variational inequality problems,” SIAM Journal
on Optimization, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 1097–1115, 2000.
